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This paper investigates regional differences in local public goods provision in 
rural area in the 2000s, using large village sample surveys (CHIP 2002 and 2007 
surveys, a survey in Ningxia). Focuses are on changes in the coverage of public 
investment projects, regional differences in the determinants of public investment 
projects, and changes in the coverage of public services provided by village 
collectives. The main findings are as follows. First, we confirmed that coverage of 
public investment projects had increased in the 2000s. Second, in spite of 
concentration of fiscal administration into county level as one of the pillars of the 
reform of taxation and local fiscal system, administrative villages still played 
indispensable roles in local public goods provision. Third, we found that incentive 
of peasants, financial ability of villages, and incentive of local government affect 
location decision and budget structure of public investment projects and that 
direction and strength of such factors were different by regions.   
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 1. Introduction 
Setting the agenda 
This paper investigates regional differences in the provision of local public goods 
in rural areas of China in the 2000s. The focus is on changes in the coverage of 
public investment projects, regional differences in the determinants of public 
investment projects, and changes in the coverage of public services provided by 
village collectives. 
As the leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have officially 
recognized, a major challenge for the party in the 2000s is to cross the great 
urban–rural divide in institutional and policy arrangements (see, for example, Hu 
2007). A series of prorural public policies (huinong zhengce) applied in the 2000s 
consequently marked an important turning point in the structure of the Chinese 
economy. Therefore, it is valuable to investigate changes in the provision of local 
public goods in the 2000s, especially before and after the implementation of rural 
taxation reform (abolition of the agricultural tax) and the “new socialist 
countryside initiatives” enacted at the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006.
1 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. To start with, in the 
remainder of this section, we describe the data utilized in the study. Section 2 
provides a review of the relevant literature. In Section 3, we summarize the 
prorural policies existing in China in the 2000s. In Section 4, we first describe the 
changes in the coverage of public investment projects, and then examine the 
determinants of the budget structure for public investment projects. In Section 5, 
                                                  
1 In Sato (2008b), we examined the impact of village-level factors, including the impact 
of local public goods on peasant income, using the CHIP 2002 survey. 
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 we describe the changes in the role of the administrative village as provider of 
local public goods by focusing on the village budget structure and the agricultural 
services provided by village collectives. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
Data 
In this paper, we utilize three administrative village surveys. The first and second 
surveys are separate rounds of the rural household/administrative village surveys 
conducted by the China Household Income Project (CHIP) in 2002 and 2007 
(hereinafter referred to as the CHIP 2002 and CHIP 2007 village data, 
respectively). The third survey comprises rural household and administrative 
village data in 2006 from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous District conducted by the 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(hereinafter referred to as IEA 2006 Ningxia village data).
2 
The CHIP 2002 and 2007 surveys are nationally representative surveys 
covering rural–urban households, rural–urban migrant households, and villages 
where the sampled rural households resided. The sampling frames of the CHIP 
surveys are subsamples of the official annual household surveys conducted by the 
National Bureau of Statistics; see Gustaffson, Li, and Sicular (2008) and Luo, Li, 
                                                  
2 An international research team headed by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, and the China Academy of Income Distribution, Beijing Normal 
University, conducted the CHIP surveys in the 2002 and 2007 rounds, respectively. The 
CHIP survey is funded by several Chinese and foreign organizations, including the 
National Foundation of Social Sciences of China, the Beijing Normal University, the 
Ford Foundation, the Swedish International Development Agency, AusAID, the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science, Hitotsubashi University, the University of Western 
Ontario, and the Ontario Research Foundation. The survey in Ningxia was funded by the 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Hitotsubashi University, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, the Ministry of 
Education, Science, and Technology, and the Heiwa Nakajima Foundation. 
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 Sicular, Deng, and Yue 2011 for detailed descriptions of the sampling framework, 
data collection, and sample representativeness. The administrative village surveys 
in the CHIP 2002 and 2007 surveys coincided with the household surveys and 
collected data on village budget structure and public service delivery by the 
village, as well as the basic geographical and economic conditions of villages 
where the sampled households resided. 
The total number of sample villages in the CHIP surveys is 961 villages in 2002 
and 800 villages in 2007. To ensure the comparability of regional coverage across 
the survey rounds, we utilize administrative village data from the nine provinces 
(Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Chongqing, and 
Sichuan) that are included in both rounds (see Appendix Table 1 for the number of 
sample villages in each province). The survey coverage for these provinces is 404 
villages in 2002 and 800 villages in 2007 (hereinafter referred to as CHIP 2002 and 
CHIP 2007survey villages). The Ningxia survey collected data on 1,200 rural 
households and 120 villages in 2006. The sampling frame in this survey is the same 
as in the CHIP surveys.  
Table 1 provides details on the basic economic conditions in the sample 
villages, from which we can derive the following key points.
3  First, by 
considering the CHIP survey villages, we can see that average village size 
increased significantly between 2002 and 2007. This reflects village merger 
promoted by fiscal/administration system reform. Of the 800 sample villages in 
2007, 333 villages (approximately 42 percent) experienced village merger. It is 
                                                  
3 See Gustafsson and Ding (2009) for a detailed investigation of economic conditions in 
CHIP 2002 survey villages and a comparison of Han and ethnic minority villages. 
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 notable that the proportion of villages that experienced merger is especially high 
in the southwestern region (109 villages, or approximately 68 percent of all 
southwestern villages, experienced merger). 
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Second, regarding the changes in employment structure, we confirm that the 
labor force mainly employed in agriculture decreased between 2002 and 2007 in 
CHIP survey villages, whereas it increased in villages experiencing out-migration. 
Third, there are large regional disparities in economic conditions between western 
region villages and those in other regions. Of the CHIP 2007 survey villages, 
villages outside the western region (coastal and central regions) generally have 
higher average income, a larger number of households that engage in 
nonagricultural self-employment (getihu), a lower proportion of the labor force 
mainly employed in agriculture, and a lower ratio of out-migration. We can also 




5 Here we limit our literature review to recent quantitative studies that 
 
 
2. Literature review 
There have been several studies concerning rural public goods provision in the 
                                                  
4 Previous studies based on village survey also found large regional disparities in 
in  economic conditions of villages. See, for example, Guowuyuan Fazhan Yanjiu Zhongx
Ketizu (2007).  
5 For comprehensive studies, see, for example, Fang, Zhang, and Zhang (2002), Xu 
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 utilize village data and examine the conditions of village-level public investment 
projects and the structure of village budgets. From this viewpoint, the existing 
literature divides across three major lines of inquiry. 
The first line of inquiry includes studies on the structure of village-level public 
investment projects before and after the rural tax and fee reform. Using panel data 
for 101 villages in five provinces from 1998 to 2007, Luo, Zhang, and Deng (2008) 
investigated changes in the structure of public investment projects at the village 
level. Their main findings are as follows. First, the number of public investment 
projects had decreased in the first half of the 2000s following the tax and fee 
reform, and subsequently recovered and increased after 2005.
6 Second, village 
budgets continued to play an indispensable role in public investment projects, 
even though there had been a downward trend in the proportion of village 
investment in total investment from 43 percent in the period 1998–2000 to 32 
percent in the period 2005–07. The share of investment funded from village 
own-budgets also varied significantly by project, from 76 percent for cultural 
facilities, 50 percent for irrigation, 42 percent for roads, and 32 percent for 
schools down to just 20 percent for sloping land conversion. Third, the proportion 
of outside funds in total investment was also higher in poorer villages. 
Using the same data as Luo, Zhang, and Deng (2008), Yi et al. (2008) examined 
the relation between the structure of public investment projects and peasant needs. 
They argued that in terms of road construction there was not a good match between 
                                                                                                                                                            
(2002), Lin (2003, 2007), Caizhengbu Nongyesi Ketizu (2004), Chen (2005), and Liu, 
Zhu, and He (2011). For the analysis of ethnic minority regions, see Wang and Zhu 
(2005). 
6 Luo, Zhang, and Deng (2008) reported that the number of public investment projects 
per village was 1.5 between 1998 and 2007.  
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 the supply and demand for public investment projects (public investment was 
frequently supplied where peasant demand was not necessarily high). 
Using a large village survey covering 2,459 villages across six provinces,
7 
Zhang, Li, Luo, Liu, and Luo (2005) illustrated the structure of village-level 
public investment projects during the period 1997–2003. The findings indicated 
that the projects most frequently carried out by villages were infrastructure (such 
as roads, bridges, and irrigation systems), education, and sloping land conversion. 
They also found that in terms of budget structures, most projects were undertaken 
using funds from the village own-budget, then projects made possible by outside 
funds (mostly from upper-level governments), and finally projects jointly funded 
by the village own-budget and outside funds. They also found that the size and 
structure of project budgets varied across regions, and that poorer villages were 
more likely to obtain funding from outside budgets. 
Employing the same data as Zhang, Li, Luo, Liu, and Luo (2005), Zhang, Luo, 
Liu, and Rozelle (2005) examined the determinants of local public goods 
provision by estimating Tobit regressions, specifying the number of public 
investment projects and the ratio of outside funds in village budgets to the total 
amount of investment as dependent variables. Variables representing peasant 
needs and government goals in local public goods provision served as explanatory 
variables. The main results were as follows. First, projects financed by upper-level 
government budgets tended to concentrate on poor, ethnic minority, and 
mountainous villages, and this reflected the political priority set for 
                                                  
7 Provinces included were Jiangsu, Gansu, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jilin, and Hebei. 
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 disadvantaged villages. 
Second, at the same time, political connections between the village and 
upper-level governments assisted villages to obtain outside-government funds. 
Finally, the development of local nonagricultural activities (measured by number 
of collective enterprises and nonagricultural self-employed households) had a 
positive effect on public investment from village own-budgets, whereas 
developments in out-migration (measured by the ratio of out-migrants to the total 
labor force) had a negative effect. This suggests that the needs of village core 
interest groups matter in the decentralized provision of local public goods. 
The second line of inquiry in this area focuses on the impact of village 
governance and social conditions on local public goods provision. This includes 
work by Luo, Zhang, Huang, Luo, and Liu (2006), Luo, Zhang, Huang, and Rozelle 
(2007), Sato (2008a), Wang and Yao (2007), Yao and Gao (2007), Zhang, Luo, Liu, 
and Rozelle (2006), Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and Huang (2003), Zhang, Fan, Zhang, 
and Huang (2004). A frequent finding of this body of work is that the quality of 
village governance, more specifically, grassroots democracy (jiceng minzhu), has 
a positive impact on the level of public goods provision and consequently 
well-being of villagers. Conversely, Tsai (2007) emphasized that informal 
governance (traditional organizations or social networks, such as the solidarity 
among villagers created through religious activities) mattered for the level of local 
public goods provision. Combining CHIP 2002 village data with county-level 
fiscal data, Sato (2008a) also argued that not just village governance but also 
governance at the county level mattered for local public goods provision. This is 
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 because the increase in intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the county budget 
following the tax and fee reform did not necessarily entail the provision of public 
improvements in rural areas by the county government. 
The final line of inquiry in this area examines each village’s own-budget and its 
impact on villager economic conditions. Using a survey of 138 villages in 
Zhejiang, Zhang and Li (2007) investigated changes in village budget structure 
before 2000 and after 2005, corresponding to the years of the tax and fee reform. 
They found that the contribution of transfers to village revenue from upper-level 
governments increased between 2000 and 2005, while in terms of village 
expenditures, approximately half of all expenditures were on infrastructure 
(mostly road construction) in both 2000 and 2005. Lastly, using the CHIP 2002 
village survey and household survey, Sato (2010) showed that village expenditure 
on public services positively influenced the growth of per capita household 
income. 
In sum, previous studies have shown that despite the concentration of fiscal 
administration at the county level following recent tax and fee reform, the 
administrative village still plays an indispensable role in the provision of local 
public goods in China. Moreover, socioeconomic factors at the village level, as 
well as fiscal conditions and the governance of local governments (mainly at the 
county level), also affect local public goods provision. 
 
3. Prorural policies in the 2000s 
We can divide the recent formulation of prorural policies in China into two main 
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 phases. The first phase corresponds to the period from the end of the 1990s up until 
2005. The second phase is associated with the post-agricultural tax era after 2006, 
as characterized by the nationwide abolition of agricultural taxes and the 
announcement of building the “New Socialist Countryside” or the Ninth “Article 
Number One” of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. 
 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 2 summarizes the major policy arrangements intended to promote rural 
development in the 2000s. The essence of these policies is expressed well in the 
slogan “giving more, taking less, and allowing more flexibility (duoyu shaoqu 
fanghuo)”, which was advocated earlier in the Sixth Article Number One in 2004. 
The baseline policy for “taking less” comprised a program of tax and fee reform 
(shuifei gaige) that followed two main steps: first, the substitution of formal 
taxation (newly defined agricultural taxes) for local levies; and second, the 
implementation of fees (tax-for-fee reform, feigaishui) and the abolition of rural 
taxation. These reforms were completed at the end of 2005/beginning of 2006 
(Sato, Li, and Yue 2008).
8 Another policy for “taking less” is the exemption from 
tuition/school fees and the subsidy for dormitory fees (liangmian yibu) for 
primary and lower-middle schools applied in 2006 for the western region and 
expanded to the central and eastern regions thereafter. This reform, in combination 
with the introduction of a county-based education budget system in the first phase, 
                                                  
8 In addition to Sato, Li, and Yue (2008), see also Fang, Lu, and Yan (2005), Liu, Xu, Tao, 
and Su (2008), and Zhou and Chen (2005) for the redistributive consequences of tax and 
fee reform. 
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 marks the start of a new epoch in basic education in China.
9 We should also note 
that the merger and reorganization of primary schools progressed alongside the 
restructuring of the education budget system after 2001, with the number of 
primary schools in rural areas decreasing from 512,993 in 1997 to 234,157 in 
2009.
10 
We can categorize the policies for “giving more” into direct subsidies, welfare 
payments, social insurance, and the reinforcement of public investments. First, the 
direct subsidies for rural households include a food grain production subsidy 
(liangshi zhibu), a comprehensive subsidy for agricultural production materials 
(nongzi zonghe butie), a subsidy for improved seeds (liangzhong butie), a subsidy 
for the purchasing of agricultural machines (gouzhi nongji butie), and various 
kinds of crop- and region-specific subsidies. We can also classify the sloping land 
conversion (tuigeng huanlin) program as a direct agricultural subsidy policy. 
Second, the welfare payments include the rural minimum living allowance 
(nongcun zuidi shenghuo baozhang, dibao) introduced nationwide in 2007. 
Although the level of allowance is very low, it represents a notable milestone in 
the system reforms aimed at addressing the rural–urban divide. Third, social 
insurance includes the new rural cooperative medical insurance (xinxing nongcun 
hezuo yiliao baoxian) that attained a participation rate of approximately 94 
percent in 2009 and the pilot program for the social pension for the rural 
population (nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian) that started in 2009. Finally, the 
                                                  
9 See Deng (2009), Wand and Wang (2006), and Zhao (2005) for peasant’s burden of 
educational fee before and after the tax and fee reform.  
10 China Youth Daily, December 24, 2011. 
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 reinforcement of public investments closely relates to the reforms in local fiscal 
and administration systems discussed below, that is, the increase in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the concentration of fiscal responsibilities 
at the county level. Thus, we need to investigate to what extent the coverage and 
budget structure of rural public investments changed following the program of tax 
and fee reform. 
In order to guarantee the principles of “taking less” and “giving more”, the 
Chinese central government began to expend efforts aimed at the adjustment of 
local fiscal and administration systems. These adjustments fall into the following 
three categories. The first category of adjustment is the change in the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers between the central and provincial governments 
and those taking place within the provinces. In 2000, the central government 
introduced an intergovernmental fiscal transfer for tax and fee reform (nongcun 
shuifei gaige zhuanxiang zhuanyi zhifu) to cover the diminished revenue of the 
county and township governments following the rural tax and fee reform (shuifei 
gaige). In 2005, the Seventh Article Number One required that no less than 70% of 
the annual increase in the local budgets for education, health, and other public 
services should be below the county level. 
The second category of adjustment is the concentration of fiscal responsibility 
at the county level. From the beginning of the 2000s, the State Council repeatedly 
demanded the establishment of a county-based (yi xian weizhu) education budget 
system to guarantee certain education spending (including teacher salaries). In 
2006, the Eighth Article Number One proposed the expansion of the direct 
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 administration of township government budgets by county governments (xiangcai 
xianguan). Similar reform at the below-township level, that is, the direct 
administration of village budgets by the township government (cunzhang 
xiangguan), was also introduced in the latter half of the 1990s, and subsequently 
expanded in the 2000s. The final category of adjustment is the restructuring of the 
below-county level administrative apparatuses, including the merger of township 
and administrative villages (chexiang bingzhen bingcun) previously advocated in 
the Sixth Article Number One in 2004 (Dang 2010). 
These adjustments took place against the background of the fundamental 
reform of the local fiscal/administration system in China, that is, the transition 
from a prefecture-level city-based system (shi guan xian) to a province- and 
county-based system (sheng zhiguan xian) by 2012.
11  The prefecture-level 
city-based system was introduced at the beginning of the 1980s as a form of 
decentralized fiscal/administration system intended to stimulate economic 
competition between core regional cities and to promote regional development 
through the trickle down of growth from regional centers (prefecture-level cities) 
to rural areas (counties administratively belonging to the prefecture-level cities). 
Fiscal redistribution within prefecture-level cities and subordinate counties was 
also expected. 
Certainly, there are some successful examples of the earlier prefecture-level 
city-based system (mostly in coastal developed areas such as Suzhou and Ningbo). 
                                                  
11 Caizhengbu (2009) “Guanyu tuijin sheng zhijie guanli xian caizheng gaige de yijian” 
(the official web site of the central government of the People’s Republic of China). 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-07/09/content_1360963.htm (accessed January 17, 
2012). 
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 However, in many middle- and low-income regions where the financial capacity of 
both the prefecture-level cities and the subordinate counties is weak, there has 
been a scramble for fiscal resources that has led to many subordinate counties, 
especially poorer counties, experiencing serious budget deficits (Han 2010). 
Instead, the province- and county-based system subordinates the county 
government budget directly to the province while also reinforcing the fiscal 
authority of the county government. In doing so, the intention of the new system is 
to facilitate intergovernmental fiscal transfers directly from provinces to the 
counties and to block the budget flows from subordinate counties to 
prefecture-level cities. This system also promotes the expansion of 
prefecture-level cities through the merger of subordinate counties. 
 
4. Determinants of public investment projects in 2005–07 
This section examines the coverage and budget sources of public investment 
projects immediately before and after the post-agricultural tax era. We conduct 
our investigation by geographical region by comparing western and nonwestern 
(eastern and central) regions. We compare these regions because differences in 
policy treatments (for example, the launch of the “Great Western Region 
Development” program in 2001) and the overall level of socioeconomic 
development can be found between these regions, and therefore there may also be 
differences in the conditions associated with public investment projects in both 
regions. In this section, we first examine the coverage of public investment 
projects during the period 2005–07. We then conduct multinomial logit estimation 
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 of the determinants of the budget structure of public investment projects using the 
examples of road construction/management and primary school projects. 
 
Coverage 
Table 3 details the percentage of sample villages with public investment projects 
in 2005–07, from which we derive the following key points. First, road 
construction/maintenance projects exhibit the highest level of coverage 
(approximately half of the villages engaged in these sorts of projects) and there is 
little evidence of any significant change in coverage. Irrigation projects follow 
road projects in terms of the level of coverage. We can thus confirm that 
conventional infrastructure-type projects remain the main pillar of public 
investment projects at the local level after the recent program of tax and fee 
reform.
12 
Second, projects related to primary education and public health increased 
considerably in 2007 (from less than 20 percent to 36 percent for primary school 
projects).
13 Third, irrigation, primary education, and public health projects in the 
southwestern region (Chongqing and Sichuan) contributed much to the overall 
increase in the coverage of public investment projects in 2007. This and the earlier 
points made above suggest the reinforcement of public investment for social 
                                                  
12 By comparing the preferences for local public services of peasants, village cadres, 
township officials, and county officials, Yi et al. (2008) found a mismatch between the 
structure of public investment projects and peasant needs arising from a local 
government bias in favor of infrastructure construction projects. As the subjective 
questions necessary for assessing peasant needs for local public services are not included 
in our survey, we are unable to investigate the presence of a similar possible mismatch. 
13 In contrast to our findings, Luo, Zhang, and Deng (2008) concluded that a decrease in 
education and public health projects followed the program of tax and fee reform. 
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 development in the inland region under the New Socialist Countryside and Great 
Western Region Development schemes. 
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Budget sources 
In the 2007 CHIP village survey, we can categorize the budget sources in village 
own-budgets as including labor contributions by villagers (cun zichou zijin) and 
outside budgets. Outside budgets include public funds obtained from upper-level 
governments, comprising county, province, and central governments, and 
nongovernmental funds, including funding from enterprises, nongovernmental 
organizations, and international organizations. Funds for poverty alleviation and 
regional development in underdeveloped areas donated from other administrative 
units (organizations) in developed areas in China are also included as 
outside-budget sources of funding. One difficulty with our data here is that we do 
have a larger number of missing values in 2007.
14  However, as the budget 
structures in 2005 and 2006 are relatively similar, we gain useful insights by 
summarizing the budget structure for 2006 in Table 4. 
 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Using the details provided in Table 4, we derive the following insights into 
budget structures. First, relatively few projects depend totally on outside-budget 
                                                  
14 The 2007 data has a relatively large number of missing values because we intended to 
collect information on the approximate amount of investment from each budget source. 
In contrast, we have fewer missing values in 2005 and 2006 because we only asked for 
information on budget sources, not the size of investment from each budget source. 
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 funding. This is because the contribution of matching funds (peitao zijin) by the 
village (including the contribution of labor by the villagers) is usually required. 
Second, village own-budgets exclusively finance a relatively large number of 
projects. Third, in terms of regional patterns in budget structure, it is notable that 
the funding for road, primary education, and public health projects in the 
southwestern region also tends to be from village own-budgets. Overall, we 
suggest that the financial capacity of individual villages still matters in terms of 
large-scale projects, and that regional disparity in the financing of public 
investment in rural China has persisted, even after the recent program of tax and 
fee reform. These findings beg the question as to the exact nature of the 
determinants of funding sources for public investment projects.
15 
 
Determinants of public investment projects: estimation framework 
Here we examine the factors that determine the budget structure of village-level 
public investment projects using multinomial logit estimation following the 
analytical framework in Zhang, Luo, Liu, and Rozelle (2005). In our chosen 
context, village-level public investment projects are projects from which villages 
benefit, as derived from the responses to questions posed to village cadres. More 
specifically, we conduct estimations for road construction/maintenance and 
primary school projects. We choose the former as it is a typical sort of 
infrastructure project conducted in rural areas, and the latter because it is an 
                                                  
15 Previous studies also emphasized large regional disparities in the structure of public 
investment projects at the township and village levels (see for example, Zhang, Li, Luo, 
Liu, and Luo  2005, Luo, Fan, Wang, and Zhang 2006). 
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 example of a social development project. We should note that although the 
consolidation of primary schools through merger and closure has progressed in the 
2000s, villages continue to contribute as beneficiaries to the construction and 
improvement of primary schools that village children attend. Therefore, we 
employ all villages, including those with and without primary schools, in our 
estimation by specifying a dummy variable indicating whether a village has a 
primary school. 
The dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating the budget source 
structure of public investment projects in 2005–06. The three categories are as 
follows. First, villages with a project funded outside budget in both 2005 and 2006 
(i.e. a village depends on funding from outside its budget for public investment 
projects). Second, villages with a project totally financed by the village 
own-budget or where outside-budget funding is received for only one year (i.e. the 
village relies relatively more on the village own-budget for public investment 
projects). We specify the final category, villages without any public investment 
projects in 2005–06, as the reference category. 
We categorize the explanatory variables in the regression into two groups as 
follows. The first group comprises variables that represent incentives and 
financial capacity at the village level. 
(a) Size of village budget measured by per capita revenue of village budget 
(figure of 2007 for CHIP 2007 survey villages, figure of 2006 for Ningxia survey 
villages). This variable measures the fiscal capacity of the village to conduct its 
own investment projects or to make financial contributions to projects carried out 
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 by upper-level governments. Thus, we expect a positive correlation between the 
size of the village budget and the likelihood of public investment projects. 
(b) Proportion of out-migrant to total labor force in the village (average of 
2005-2007 for CHIP 2007 survey villages, average of 2004-2006 for Ningxia 
survey villages). This variable reflects the changes in peasant needs for local 
public goods combined with the rapid increase in social mobility discussed in 
Zhang, Luo, Liu, and Rozelle (2005). We assume that the development of 
out-migration may weaken villager interests in local socioeconomic conditions. If 
this is the case, a higher proportion of out-migrants will negatively influence the 
likelihood of public investment projects. 
The second group of explanatory variables in our regression model is variables 
that capture the incentives for local government to allocate funds to public 
investment projects. In the context of this study, local governments are county 
(county-level city) governments mainly responsible for managing local public 
goods provision in the post-agricultural tax era. Specifically, we introduce the 
following variables into our specification. 
First, we regard the size of the village budget specified earlier as an indicator 
of the mixed incentives for local governments. On the one hand, local governments 
have an incentive to allocate funds to poorer villages to produce political gains in 
poverty alleviation. On the other hand, because of the needs for matching 
financial/labor contributions by villages, local governments would prefer to 
mobilize only those villages with sufficient own-budgets to engage in public 
investment projects. Second, in addition to village budget size, we include the 
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 following variables to measure local government incentives. 
(c) Village size measured by number of households (figure of 2007 for CHIP 
2007 survey villages, figure of 2006 for Ningxia survey villages). This reflects the 
size of the population covered by public investment. We expect a positive effect of 
village size on the probability of having projects financed outside budget because 
local government can increase population coverage by making larger villages the 
beneficiaries of public investment projects. 
(d) Dummy variable for provincially designated township for poverty 
alleviation (fupin gongjian xiang). County governments assign priority to these 
townships in public investment projects and therefore we expect a positive 
correlation between this variable and the probability of obtaining funding from 
outside budgets. 
(e) County dummies. We employ county dummies to capture the fiscal capacity 
of county government, the policy preferences of county officials, and various 
other politico-economic factors affecting public fund allocation. 
In addition to these variables, we employ the following three case-specific 
variables. 
(f) Distance from the nearest transportation station (road 
construction/maintenance projects). We assume that consideration of investment 
efficiency and political attention to villages remote from transportation 
thoroughfares will affect the location decisions of county governments concerning 
road construction/maintenance projects. Distance from the nearest transportation 
station should reflect both of these political considerations. 
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 (g) Dummy variable for whether the primary school village children attend has 
a “dangerous building (weifang)” problem (primary school projects). As both 
central and provincial governments consider this an urgent problem requiring 
urgent rectification, county governments will give priority to primary schools 
affected. We expect a positive effect of this variable on the probability of villages 
having primary school projects financed from an outside budget. 
(h) Distance from the nearest township (primary school projects). Considering 
the major reorganization of primary schools in the 2000s, school location policy at 
the county and other upper-government levels will affect the allocation of primary 
school projects. Given every township generally has a full-grade “central primary 
school (zhongxin xiaoxue)” the children of surrounding villages attend, the 
distance from the township will reflect school location policy. 
Lastly, we introduce the following two case-specific control variables: (i) when 
the village road connected the village to the township (only in the estimation of 
road construction/maintenance projects), and (j) a dummy variable indicating 
whether a primary school (including full-grade and others) is located in the village 
(only in the estimation of primary school projects). 
 
Determinants of public investment projects: estimation results 
Tables 5 and 6 provide the estimation results. Summary statistics for the variables 
used in the estimations are in Appendix Table 2. In sum, we find evidence that both 
incentive/capacity at the village level and the incentives of local governments 
affect the probability of public investment projects. In addition, regional 
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 differences between western and nonwestern regions influence the effects of each 
determinant. We summarize the major findings as follows. 
 
<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
First, the estimation results for the size of the village budget appear to reflect 
regional differences in the effect of local government incentives and financial 
capacity at the village level. In the nonwestern region, village budget size 
positively and significantly correlates with the probability of road 
construction/maintenance projects and the coefficients are almost the same for 
villages that depend on outside budgets and those that rely more on village 
own-budgets. In contrast, in the western region, village budget size has a negative 
and statistically significant correlation with the probability of road 
construction/maintenance projects depending on outside budgets, whereas there is 
no significant correlation for projects mainly funded by village own-budgets. In 
terms of primary education projects, there are also positive and significant 
correlations between village budget size and the probability of a project in the 
nonwestern region relying more on village own-budgets. Conversely, in the 
western region, there are no significant correlations. In summarizing these 
findings, we suggest that local governments in the western region express concern 
in fund allocation for poverty alleviation as a political objective, whereas local 
governments in the nonwestern region are more likely to consider the availability 
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 of resources at the village level.
16 
Second, regional differences in the socioeconomic impact of labor mobility 
between western and nonwestern regions influence the development of 
out-migration effects. We find that the ratio of out-migrants to the total labor force 
negatively and significantly affects the probability of having road 
construction/maintenance projects that rely more on village own-budgets in the 
nonwestern region. In contrast, the ratio of out-migrants to the total labor force 
has positive and statistically significant effects on the probability of road 
construction/maintenance projects financed solely by outside budgets in the 
western region. The former supports our inference that developments in 
out-migration tend to weaken the interest of villagers in the provision of local 
public goods. Conversely, the latter suggests that, at least in the western region 
where the promotion of out-migration is one of the pillars of regional development 
strategy, infrastructure investment by local government positively correlates with 
the degree of out-migration. In contrast to road construction/maintenance projects, 
we find no statistically significant correlations in both the western and nonwestern 
regions between developments in out-migration and the probability of primary 
school projects. We explain this by suggesting that as many of the children of 
out-migrants remain behind in villages, the level of out-migration does not affect 
peasant interests in the improvement of local school conditions. 
Third, we also find regional differences in the influence of village size. Village 
                                                  
16 Luo, Zhang, and Deng (2008) also argued that public investment by local government 
became more concentrated on poorer villages.  
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 size positively and significantly correlated with the probability of consistently 
obtaining funds outside budget for road construction/maintenance projects in both 
the western and nonwestern regions. This finding reflects the incentive of local 
government to increase the population coverage of public investments. In the 
nonwestern region, it also positively and significantly increased the probability of 
projects relying more on village own-budgets for both road and primary school 
projects, whereas we found no such significant effects in the western region. This 
finding suggests that village size potentiality reflects the capacity of villages to 
mobilize their own resources, a contributing factor especially prevalent in the 
nonwestern region. 
Fourth, the dummy variable for villages located in provincially designated 
townships for poverty alleviation has a stronger positive effect in the nonwestern 
region than in the western region. In the case of primary school projects, a village 
associated with a provincially designated township for poverty alleviation 
positively and significantly increases the probability of projects being financed 
consistently outside budget in both the western and nonwestern regions. This 
finding evidences the increasing concern for basic education in rural areas in the 
2000s. In the case of road construction/maintenance projects, this variable 
positively and significantly correlates with the probability of projects both with 
and without outside-budget funding in the nonwestern region, whereas there is no 
significant correlation in the western region. This finding may thus reflect the 
disparity in the fiscal abilities of local governments found in the western and 
nonwestern regions. 
  24 
 
 Fifth, the estimation result for the distance from the nearest transportation 
station suggests that local government location decisions for road 
construction/maintenance projects have a stronger influence in the western region 
than in the nonwestern region. In the western region, the correlation between the 
distance from the nearest transportation station and the probability of a road 
construction/maintenance project with financial support outside budget exhibits a 
U-shaped curve. That is, greater probabilities for villages located near a 
transportation station (less than 5 kilometers) than villages located far from a 
transportation station (more than 20 kilometers). This finding supports our 
assumption that the location decisions of county governments on road 
construction/maintenance projects will consider both investment efficiency and 
political attention to villages remote from transportation thoroughfares. By 
contrast, we find no such association in the nonwestern region. 
Sixth, unlike the evidence concerning the location decisions of road 
construction/maintenance projects, the influence of school reorganization policy 
appears to exert a stronger influence in the nonwestern region than in the western 
region. In the nonwestern region, the correlation between the distance from the 
nearest township and the probability of a primary school project financed outside 
budget exhibits a U-shaped curve similar to that found for the distance from the 
nearest transportation station. That is, greater probabilities for villages located 
near a township (less than 2 kilometers) than villages located far from a township 
(more than 20 kilometers). This U-shaped relationship suggests local governments 
in the nonwestern region tend to allocate fiscal resources to schools located in 
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 townships (central primary schools, zhongxin xiaoxue) or to schools located far 
away from townships. We find no such associations in the western region, 
suggesting the distribution of school location is more even in the western region 
than in the nonwestern region. Finally, the consideration given to primary schools 
with a “dangerous building” problem is stronger in the western region than in the 
nonwestern region, with such primary schools also more likely to obtain the 
necessary funds outside budget. 
 
5. Public services provided by villages in 1998–2007 
In the previous section, we found that the financial capacity of a village matters as 
to whether it is a beneficiary of public investment projects. Here we turn our 
attention to the structure of village budget and public services provided directly by 
villages. Regarding the CHIP survey villages, we consider the situations that 
existed in 1998, 2002, and 2007. For the Ningxia villages, we illustrate the 
situation in 2006. 
Table 7 details the size and structure of village expenditures from 1998 to 2007, 
in which we can discern the changes in the delivery of public services from village 
own-budgets. We make two key points using the information in this table. First, 
per capita expenditure in village budgets remained relatively constant between 
1998 and 2002, and then substantially increased between 2002 and 2007 
(associated with an increase of approximately 22 percent).
17 The lack of change in 
per capita expenditure between 1998 and 2002 mainly reflects the reduction of 
                                                  
17 The large increase in village expenditure between 2002 and 2007 also reflects the 
process of village merger after 2002 (see also Table 1). 
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 village budgets associated with the program of tax and fee reform (abolition of 
local levies and fees) after 2000. In contrast, the system of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers from counties (either directly from the county or via the township) 
enabled the increase in per capita expenditure between 2002 and 2007.
18 Second, 
the ratio of expenditure on public services to total expenditure exhibited an 
increasing trend from 1998 to 2007, whereas the proportion of administrative 
expenditure (mostly village official allowances) decreased between 2002 and 
2007. 
 
<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 8 illustrates the changes in the proportion of villages providing services 
for agricultural production between 2002 and 2007. We make two points using the 
information in this table as follows. First, even though there was a consistent 
disparity between nonwestern and southwestern provinces at the time, the 
proportion of villages providing agricultural services increased in southwestern 
provinces between 2002 and 2007, especially in terms of irrigation and evacuation 
services. The Ningxia data also displays relatively large proportions in 2006. 
Second, out-migration-related services had developed in the western region by the 
2000s, with the proportion of villages providing organization and intermediation 
of out-migration increasing from approximately 5 percent to 14 percent between 
2002 and 2007 in the southwestern provinces. It is also notable that the proportion 
                                                  
18 If we examine the changes in village expenditure between 1998 and 2002 according to 
the status of tax and fee reform, we find that per capita village expenditure decreased 
from 110 yuan in 1998 to 95 yuan in 2002 (in 2002 prices) in postreform villages. 
Subsequently, per capita fiscal transfers from upper-level authorities increased from 131 
yuan in 2002 to 164 yuan in 2007 (in 2002 prices). 
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 of villages providing organization and intermediation of out-migration is very 
high in Ningxia (70 percent). 
 
<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE> 
 
To summarize, public services provided by villages in China still matter in the 
post-agricultural tax era. In fact, we find that the village budget structure became 
more public service oriented between 2002 and 2007. After considering the fact 
that during this time villages had lost their own pseudo-local tax (cun tiliu) and 
other levies and fees collected directly from villagers because of the program of 
tax and fee reform, we can see that the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
enabled the provision of public services. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, we confirmed that the 
coverage of public investment projects increased in the 2000s. In this sense, the 
beginning of the post-agricultural tax era and the launch of the “Socialist New 
Countryside” program represent a new phase in rural public policy in China. 
However, a quantitative increase in the provision of public goods does not 
necessarily equate with a qualitative improvement. In fact, our data show some 
signs of increased concern over the changes in the quality of local public goods. 
Table 9 summarizes the evaluation of village cadres of the quality of public goods 
provision after the program of tax and fee reform. In particular, as shown, village 
cadres in the southwestern region are more likely to believe that the quality of 
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 local road and irrigation systems deteriorated following these fiscal reforms 
(Table 9A).
19   We should also note that village cadres in Ningxia are less 
optimistic about the quality of primary education after the reform (Table 9B). 
                                                 
 
<TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Second, despite the concentration of fiscal administration at the county level as 
one of the pillars of the taxation and local fiscal system reforms, administrative 
villages still play an indispensable role in local public goods provision. We found 
most public investment projects are jointly financed from outside budgets (mostly 
local government budgets) and village own-budgets (including labor contributions 
by villagers). At the same time, the proportion of villages providing agricultural 
services increased between 2002 and 2007. Thus, the financial capacity of villages 
remains critical in the delivery of local public services in China. 
Third, we found that the incentives of peasants, the financial capacity of 
villages, and the incentives of local government all affect location decisions and 
the budget structure of public investment projects, and that the direction and 
influence of these factors differ by region. Regarding the incentive structure for 
peasants, it is notable that the development of out-migration has different impacts 
in western and nonwestern regions. Concerning the incentive of local (county and 
county-level city) governments to carry out public investment, we found that 
factors relating to political objectives, such as population coverage, investment 
 
19 The CHIP 2002 village survey indicated a similar problem in that village cadres 
generally believed that the actual amount of funds allocated to local public goods tended 
to decrease following tax and fee reform (see Sato 2008a). 
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efficiency, the possibility of mobilizing local resources, and concern over poverty 
alleviation, influenced the location decisions for public investment projects. 
Of course, this analysis also helped identify a number of interesting areas for 
future research. One of these is that it would be interesting to investigate further 
the regional patterns of local public goods provision from a different angle. 
Consequently, as a next step, we intend to conduct a comparison of local public 
goods provision in ethnic minority and Han villages using recent data sets.
20
 
20 Gustafsson and Ding (2009) undertook a comparative analysis of economic 
conditions in Han and ethnic minority villages using the CHIP 2002 village and 
household surveys. References 
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计," 经济研究.) Table 1 Basic economic condition of sample villages 
 
A. CHIP 2002/2007 survey villages and Ningxia survey villages 

























Population (persons)  404  1,860   788  2,346   120  2,127 
Number of household 
(households) 
 
404  497   788  644   120  486 
cultivated land (mu) 
  397  1,863   800  2,110   120  5,743 
per capita cultivated 
land (mu)  
 
397  1.1   788  1.0   120  3.1 
Irrigated land/total 
cultivated land (%) 
 
397  73.8   789  70.9   120  54.2 
Proportion of labor 
force mainly employed 
in agriculture (%) 
 
404  60.9   800  50.4   116  63.1 
Proportion of labor 
force who work 
outside township (%) 
 






(getihu) (%)  
 
388  5.6   763  5.7   120  5.9 
Per capita disposable 
income (yuan , in 2002 
price) 
 
395  2,983   800  4,507   116  2,127 
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B. Comparison of Eastern/central and Southwestern villages in CHIP 2007 
survey 






  630 2,337 158 2,377   
Number of household 
(households) 
 
630 626 158 713   
cultivated land (mu) 
  635 2,184 160 1,812   
per capita cultivated land (mu)  
  629 1.04 158 0.85   
Irrigated land/total cultivated 
land (%) 
 
629 76.0 160 50.8   
Proportion of labor force mainly 
employed in agriculture (%) 
 
635 48.7 158 57.2   
Proportion of labor force who 
work outside township (%) 
 
628 24.3 158 34.3   
Proportion of households who 
engage in nonagricultural 
self-employment (getihu) (%)  
 
610 6.2 153 3.8   
per capita disposable income 
(yuan , in 2002 price) 
 
640 4,797 160 3,347   
Notes:  
1. Eastern and Central villages denote villages in Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei. Southwestern village denotes villages in 
Chongqing and Sichuan.  
2. N denotes number of effective observations for each indicator.  
3. Per capita disposable income is adjusted to 2002 price by national rural CPI 
(regional price differences are not adjusted). 
Sources: CHIP 2002 and 2007 village data; Ningxia village data; China Statistical 
Yearbook, various years. 
  36Table 2 Overview of pro-rural policies in the 2000s 
  Phase 1 (–2005)  
 
Phase 2 (2006–)  




2001 Launch of the “Great 
Western Region 
Development” program. 
2002 The 16th Congress of the 
CPC pointed out to tackle on 
the  “dual structure of urban 
and rural areas (chengxiang 
eryuan jiegou)”. 
2003 CPC Central Committee 
Conference on rural work 
advocated “agriculture, rural, 
and peasant issues” as the 
most important task for the 
party.    
2004 CPC Central Committee 
and the State Council 
(CC/SC), “Comments on 
several policies to promote 
increase in peasant income 
(The 6th Article Number One) 
claimed the retention of 
“giving more, taking less, and 
allowing more flexibility 
(duoyu shaoqu fanghuo)” 
policies. 
2004 CPC Central Committee 
Conference on economic work 
advocated “helping the 
agricultural sector by 
promoting the manufacturing 
sector (yigong zhunong)” and 
“promoting rural areas by 
developing urban areas 
(yicheng dainong)”. 
2005 CC/SC, “Comments on 
several policies for 
strengthening of rural work 
and improvement of 
comprehensive agricultural 
production ability” (The 7th 
Article Number One).  
2005 CPC Central Committee 
Conference on rural work 
confirmed the policy agenda 
of “the manufacturing sector 
repays the agricultural sector 
(gongye fanbu nongye), urban 
area supports rural area 
(chengshi zhichi nongcun)” 
during the 11th FYP.  
2006-2010 The 11th FYP. 
2006 CC/SC, “On the building of new 
socialist countryside (shehuizhuyi 
xinnongcun jianshe)” (The 8th Article 
Number One).  
2007 CC/SC, “Several comments on 
development of modern agriculture and 
promoting the building of new socialist 
countryside” (The 9th Article Number 
One).  
2007 The 17th Congress of the CPC 
emphasized the harmonized planning and 
development of urban and rural areas 
(tongchou chengxiang). 
2008 CC/SC, “Several comments on 
strengthening of agricultural 
infrastructure building, promotion of 
further agricultural development, and 
increase of peasant income” (The 10th 
Article Number One). 
2008 The 3
rd Plenum of CPC Central 
Committe, “Decision on several critical 
issues on promoting rural reform and 
development”. 
2009 CC/SC, “Several comments on 
promoting stable development of 
agriculture and continuing increase of 
peasant income” (The 2009 Article 
Number One).  
2010 CC/SC, “Several comments on 
strengthening of the harmonized 
development of urban and rural areas and 
establishing a basis of agricultural and 
rural development” (The 2010 Article 
Number One).  
2011 CC/SC, “Several comments on 
acceleration of reform and development 
of irrigation” (The 2011 Article Number 
One). 
 











Substitution of formal 
taxation for local levies and 
fees. 
2000- Introduction of inter- 
governmental fiscal transfer 
for tax and fee reform 
(nongcun shuifei gaige 
zhuanxiang zhuanyi zhifu). 
2004-2005 Gradual abolition of 
agricultural taxes (agricultural 
tax (nongyeshui), special 
agricultural tax (nongye techan 
shui), livestock farming tax 
(muyeshui), and additional fee 
for agricultural taxes 
(abolished in 22 provinces by 
the end of 2005).  
2004 The 6th Article Number 




departments and merger of 
townships and administrative 
villages (chexiang bingzhen 
bingcun). 
2005 The 7th Article Number 
One claimed that no less than 
70% of annual increase in local 
budget for education, health, 
and other public services 
should be invested to 
below-county level (rural 
area).  
 
Direct administration of village 
budget by township 
government (cunzhang 
xiangguan) introduced in the 
latter half of 1990s and 
expanded in the 2000s. 
2006 Declaration of total abolition of 
agricultural taxes. 
 
2006 The 8th Article Number One proposed 
to expand the direct administration of 
county budget by province (sheng 
zhiguan xiancaizheng) and the direct 
supervision and administration of 
township government budget by county 
government (xiangcai xianguan). 
 
2008 CC/SC, “Comments on the reform of 
local governmental apparatuses”  
 
2009 The 2009 Article Number One 
declared to promote expansion of 
purview of county government owning 
strong economic foundation (kuoquan 
qiangxian) and direct supervision and 
administration of county by province 
(sheng zhiguan xian). 
 
2009 Ministry of Finance declared to 
complete the transition of local fiscal 
system from administration of county 
budget by prefecture-level city 
(shiguanxian) to direct administration of 
county budget by province (shengzhiguan 




1998-2001 Procurement of food 
grain by government 
supporting prices in the wake 
of declining market prices.  
2001 Accession to the World 
Trade Organization. 
2001-2004 Liberalization of 
food grain prices. Newly 
implementation of minimum 
procurement prices (zuidi 
shougou jiage) system. 
 







2002 Nationwide expansion of 
the sloping land conversion 
(tuigeng huanlin) program, 
which provides subsidy (grain 
and cash) to fallow land 
/reforestation (25 provinces 
covered). 
2004 Nationwide introduction of 
food grain production subsidy 
(liangshi zhibu). Subsidy for 
improved seeds (liangzhong 
butie), and subsidy for 
purchasing of agricultural 
machines (gouzhi nongji butie) 
also introduced. 
2006 Nationwide introduction of the 
comprehensive subsidy for agricultural 
production materials (nongzi zonghe 
butie).  
 
2007 Nationwide introduction of the rural 
minimum living allowance (nongcun zuidi 
shenghuo baozhang, dibao) in rural area 
(47.6 million persons, 22.9 million 
households received allowance in 2009). 
2007 The State Council announced to 





2003 Nationwide introduction of 
the new rural cooperative 
medical insurance (xinxing 
nongcun hezuo yiliao 
baoxian). 
2009 The State Council started pilot 
program of the social pension for rural 
population (nongcun shehui yanglao 
baoxian), which covered 10% of the total 
number of counties.  
2009 Participation rate of the new rural 




2000-2003 Abolition of 
additional tax for education 
(jiaoyufei fujia) 
2001 The State Council 
“Decision on reform and 
development of basic 
education” declared reform of 
education budget system and 
reorganization of school 
locations. 
2003 The State Council declared 
to accelerate completion of 
rural compulsory education 
and county-based 
(yixianweizhu) education 
budget system.  
2005 The State Council declared 
to strengthen central 
government’s responsibility 
as well as county-based 
budget system for rural 
compulsory education 
2006 Compulsory education law advocated 
completion of nine-years compulsory 
education free of charge. 
2006 Exemption of tuition/school fees and 
subsidy for dormitory fee (liangmian 
yibu) for primary and lower middle 
schools in Western region. 
2007 Tuition/school fees exemption and 
subsidy for dormitory fee expanded to 
Central and Eastern regions. 
2008-  Large increase in intergovernmental 
transfer for compulsory education from 
central  budget. 
Sourcse: Guowuyuan Gongbao [The State Council Bulletin], various issues; 
Dang(2010); Ikegami (2009); Sato (2008a);Sato, Li, and Yue (2008). 
 
 Table 3 Proportion of villages having public investment project 2005-2007 (%) 
 
A. CHIP 2007 survey villages  
 
2005 2006 2007
Road construction/management   
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) region 53.1 49.3  49.8
Southwestern (not including Ningxia) 
region  46.3 49.4    49.4 
Total 
  51.8 49.4    49.8 
Irrigation  
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) region 40.0 39.5  47.0
Southwestern (not including Ningxia) 
region  33.1 35.1    55.6 
Total 
  38.6 38.7    48.8 
Primary education   
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) region 20.6 17.4  31.7
Southwestern (not including Ningxia) 
region  15.0 15.0    53.1 
Total 
  19.5 17.0    36.0 
Public health   
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) region 19.7 21.4  35.3
Southwestern (not including Ningxia) 
region  15.0 15.0    60.0 
Total 
  18.8 20.1    40.3 
 
B. Ningxia survey villages 
   2004 2005 2006 
Road construction/management  18.6 23.5 25.7 
Irrigation 29.4 33.0 42.6 
Primary education  14.0 13.8 22.1 
Public health  11.6 13.7 43.9 
Note: Numbers of observations are 640 for Eastern and Central region, 160 for 
Southwestern region, and 120 for Ningxia.  
Sources: CHIP 2007 village data; Ningxia village data. 
  40Table 4 Budget structure of public investment projects in 2006 
(%) 
A. CHIP 2007 survey villages 
    No project
at all  Having project financed by:     









Road construction/management    
Non-Western region 
(Eastern and Central)  50.7 22.3 23.9 3.1
Southwestern region  50.6 28.1 15.0  6.3
Total 50.6 23.5 22.1  3.8
Irrigation      
Non-Western region 
(Eastern and Central)  60.5 21.7 15.5 2.3
Southwestern region  64.9 16.3 11.9  6.9
Total 61.3 20.6 14.8  3.3
Primary education       
Non-Western region 
(Eastern and Central)  82.6 11.4 4.1 1.9
Southwestern region  85.0 10.6 3.1  1.3
Total 83.0 11.3 3.9  1.8
Public health       
Non-Western region 
(Eastern and Central)  78.6 14.2 5.8 1.4
Southwestern region  85.0 10.6 2.5  1.9
Total 79.9 13.5 5.1  1.5
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B. Ningxia survey villages 
    No project
at all  Having project financed by:     















































Notes:  Number of observations same as the previous table. 
Sources: CHIP 2007 village data; Ningxia village data. 
 
  42Table 5 Determinants of road construction/maintenance projects, 2005-2006 
 
A. Non-Western region (Eastern and Central regions) 




Reference category:  
No project at all 
Village budget only or 
receiving outside budget 
only in one year  
Received outside budget 
in both years 
 Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Coefficient   Standard 
error 
Located in provincially 
designated township for poverty 
alleviation (dummy) 
0.7740* 0.4611  1.0844* 0.6554 
Village size (number of 
households) 
 
0.0007* 0.0004  0.0014***  0.0005 
Per capita village revenue (yuan) 
  
0.0008* 0.0004  0.0009* 0.0005 
Proportion of out-migration to 
total labor force 
-2.4833*** 0.9105 -1.1677  1.2311 
Distance from the nearest 
transportation station (omitted 
category less than 2 kilometers) 
     
2-5 kilometers  0.3996  0.2789  0.4633  0.3763 
5-10 kilometers  0.4192  0.3523  0.6780  0.4857 
10-20 kilometers  0.3981  0.4580  0.7144  0.6541 
More than 20 kilometers  -0.1585  0.6560  0.7184  0.9381 
Time of road connected to 
township (omitted category 
before 1969 
     
Not yet connected   -2.3087*  1.1837  -16.6177  2747.83 
1970-79 0.0701  0.3436  0.5237  0.4313 
1980-89 -0.2568  0.3817  0.0210  0.5090 
1990-98 -0.2129  0.3764  -0.0399  0.5281 
1999- -0.6590*  0.3766  -0.4896  0.5114 
County dummies  Yes    Yes   
Constant   -1.0092  0.8150  -18.7690  2567.89 
Pseudo R squared  0.2629 
LR chi squared  332.27 
Prob>chi squared  0.0000 
Number of observations  617 
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B. Western region 




Reference category:  
No project at all 
Village budget only or 
receiving outside budget only 
in one year  
Received outside budget in 
both years 
 Coefficient    Standard 
error 
Coefficient   Standard 
error 
Located in provincially 
designated township for 
poverty alleviation 
(dummy) 
-0.4996 0.6028  -0.9586  0.7517 
Village size (number of 
households) 
0.0009 0.0008  0.0021*  0.0012 
Per capita village 
revenue (yuan)  
0.0018 0.0020  -0.0200**  0.0095 
Proportion of 
out-migration to total 
labor force 
1.8916 1.3244  3.9723**  1.6232 
Distance from the 
nearest transportation 
station (omitted 
category less than 2 
kilometers) 
      
2-5 kilometers  -0.0508  0.5263  1.0151  0.7338 
5-10 kilometers  -1.4801  0.5997  -1.9002**  0.8652 
10-20 kilometers  -0.6509  0.7693  -1.9875*  1.1919 
More than 20 kilometers  1.5414  1.3410  1.0137  1.6839 
Time of road connected 
to township (omitted 
category before 1969 
      
Not yet connected   -1.4625  1.5080  -19.2007  3351.589 
1970-79 -0.0754  0.5708  -1.5015  0.9807 
1980-89 -0.6690  0.6032  -1.2437  0.8505 
1990-98 0.0184**  0.6445  -1.5434  0.9621 
1999- 0.6819  0.6546  -0.6535  0.9153 
County dummies         
Constant   -18.5664  7670  -17.8222  12096.21 
Pseudo R squared  0.3719 
LR chi squared  197.68 
Prob>chi squared  0.0000 
Number of observations  266 
  
Notes:  
1. See Appendix Table 2 for descriptive statistics of variables used in this table.  
2. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Sources: CHIP 2007 village data; Ningxia village data. 
  
  44Table 6 Determinants of Primary school projects, 2005-2006 
 
A. Non-Western region (Eastern and Central regions) 





Reference category:  
No project at all 
Village budget only or 
receiving outside budget only 
in one year  
Received outside budget in 
both years 
 Coefficient    Standard 
error 
Coefficient   Standard 
error 
Located in provincially 
township for poverty 
alleviation (dummy) 
0.1389 0.5789  1.6967*  0.9973 
Village size (number of 
households) 
0.0014*** 0.0005  0.0006  0.0007 
Per capita village 
revenue (yuan)  
0.0006* 
 
0.0003 0.0005  0.0005 
Proportion of 
out-migration to total 
labor force 
-0.4504 1.1425  -4.1061  2.6624 
Primary school 
(full-grade or other 
types) located within the 
village 
1.1625*** 0.4233  2.1753** 0.8870 
“Dangerous building” 
problem in primary 
school 
0.4055 0.4108  0.7413  0.8589 
Distance from the 
township(omitted 
category less than 2 
kilometers) 
      
2-5 kilometers  0.3483  00.4274  -2.1069***  0.7648 
5-10 kilometers  0.6648  0.4670  -1.5709**  0.7775 
10-20 kilometers  -0.1504  0.6522  -1.6927*  1.0172 
More than 20 kilometers  1.7161  1.7013  16.0843  1743.591 
County dummies  Yes    Yes   
Constant   -3.6590  0.9345  -19.3313  4417.155 
Pseudo R squared  0.3980 
LR chi squared  316.32 
Prob>chi squared  0.0000 
Number of observations  617 
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Table 6 continued 
 
B. Western region 




Reference category:  
No project at all 
Village budget only or 
receiving outside budget 
only in one year  
Received outside budget in 
both years 
 Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Coefficient   Standard 
error 
Located in provincially 
township for poverty 
alleviation (dummy) 
-0.3613 1.0648  1.3817* 0.7913 
Village size (number of 
households, 2006) 
0.0014 0.0012  -0.0007 0.0015 
Per capita village revenue 
(yuan)  
-0.0016 0.0057  -0.0059  0.0065 
Proportion of out-migration 
to total labor force 
0.8324 2.2708  -1.1796 1.7489 
Primary school (full-grade 
or other types) located 
within the village 
-0.4399 0.8325  1.9428  1.2773 
“Dangerous building” 
problem in primary school 
-0.4621 1.1167  1.6052* 0.8839 
Distance from the nearest 
transportation (omitted 
category less than 2 
kilometers) 
      
2-5 kilometers  1.5462  1.0464  -0.5748  0.8331 
5-10 kilometers  0.9657  1.0655  -1.001  0.8170 
10-20 kilometers  0.9970  1.1663  -0.4213  0.8225 
More than 20 kilometers  -15.8778  6647.962  -18.0600  4889.936 
County dummies         
Constant   -20.1422  18409.43  -20.5875  16318.2 
Pseudo R squared  0.4916 
LR chi squared  160.11 
Prob>chi squared  0.0000 
Number of observations  266 
   
Notes:  
1. See Appendix Table 2 for descriptive statistics of variables used in this table.  
2. ***, **, * denote the level of statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. 
Sources: CHIP 2007 village data; Ningxia village data. Table 7 Size and structure of village expenditure 
 
A. CHIP survey villages, 1998-2007  
Size of village expenditure  (yuan, in 
2002 price)  1998 2002 2007 
 Total amount of village expenditure 160,180  176,231  344,895  
N  391 394 783   
 Per capita village village expenditure 112.3  111.5  136.4  
N  391 394 777   
Structure of village expenditure (%)             
 Investment on collective economic 
entities   4.3 4.8 3.7   
 Road, irrigation, and other 
infrastructure   12.5 15.3 24.8   
 Expenditure for education   6.8  4.5  2.1  
 Medical care and public health   0.7  0.6  3.1  
 Other public services  11.9  11.9  12.3  
 Village official's allowance  34.9  35.8  28.4  
 Other administrative expenditures  10.5  10.0  10.6  
 Other expenditures  18.3  17.0  14.9  
 Total   100.0  100.0  100.0  
N 391 394 781 
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Table 7 continued 
 
B. Ningxia, 2006 
Size of village expenditure  (yuan) 
 Total amount of village expenditure 61,057.25
N 120
 Per capita village village expenditure 26.00
N 120
Structure of village expenditure (%)   
 Investment on collective economic 
entities   6.6
 Road, irrigation, and other 
infrastructure   18.7
 Expenditure for education   1.3
 Medical care and public health   0.2
 Other public services  NA
 Village official's allowance  44.8
 Other administrative expenditures  13.8
 Other expenditures  14.6
 Total   100
N 118
Notes:  
1. Data for 1998 and 2002 are from CHIP 2002 survey, data for 2007 are from CHIP 
2007 survey.  
2. N denotes number of effective observations for each indicator. 
3. Amount of expenditure deflated into 2002 price using national rural CPI.  
4. Zero values converted to missing values for 1998 and 2002, keeping zero for CHIP 
2007 villages and Ningxia villages.   








 Table 8 Proportion of villages providing agricultural services 
 
A: CHIP survey villages 1998-2007                                           (%) 





Irrigation and evacuation service 
    
1998     46.4 20.0 42.1   
2002     45.8 17.1 41.1   
2007     37.8 33.1 36.9   
Mechanized cultivation service 
    
1998     12.3 4.3 11.1   
2002     11.4 2.9 10.1   
2007     12.2 8.8 11.5   
Prevention of diseases and insects 
    
1998     17.1 18.6 17.5   
2002     15.0 7.1 13.8   
2007     13.1 18.8 14.3   
Organization and intermediation of out-migration 
   
1998     4.5 5.7 4.9   
2002     5.1 5.7 5.4   
2007     9.8 32.5 14.4   
    
    
B: Ningxia survey villages, 2006                                             (%) 
Irrigation and evacuation service  
 
44.2 
Mechanized cultivation service  
 
20.8 
Prevention of diseases and insects 
 
15.0 




Note: Numbers of observations are 640 for Eastern and Central region, 160 for 
Southwestern region, and 120 for Ningxia.  
Sources: CHIP 2002 and 2007 village data; Ningxia 2006 village data. 
  49Table 9 Village cadre's evaluation of the quality of local public goods provision 
after the tax and fee reform 
 
A. CHIP 2007 survey villages                                                                      (%) 





improved  Total 
Quality of road construction/management 
      
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) 10.1 32.8 57.1  100.0 
Southwestern 16.4 37.1 46.5  100.0 
Total 11.4  33.7  54.9    100.0 
       Pr=0.023
Quality of irrigation  
             
Eastern and Central  13.3 48.7 37.9  100.0 
Southwestern 22.6 44.0 36.4  100.0 
Total 15.2  47.8  37.0    100.0 
       Pr=0.014
Quality of primary education   
             
Non-Western (Eastern and Central) 12.2 50.0 37.9  100.0 
Southwestern 12.1 51.5 36.4  100.0 
Total 12.1  50.2  37.7    100.0 
   Pr=0.971
 
B: Ningxia survey villages, 2006                                                              (%) 







improved  Total 
 17.5 46.5 36.0  100.0
   
Notes:  
1. Data for quality of road management and irrigation management are not 
available for Ningxia. 
2. Pr indicates probability level of chi-square test for independence in each 
contingency table. 
Sources: CHIP 2007 village data; Ningxia 2006 village data. 
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Sources: CHIP 2002 and 2007 village data; Ningxia 2006 village data.Appendix Table 2 Descriptive statistics for multinominal logit estimation 
 (Tables 5, 6)   
A. Non-Western region (Eastern and Central) 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 




      
No project at all  0.3598 0.4803 0 1
Village budget only or receiving outside 
budget only in one year 
0.4700 0.4995 0 1
Received outside budget in both years   0.1702 0.3761 0 1
Primary school projects  
 
  
No project at all  0.7780 0.4160 0 1
Village budget only or receiving outside 
budget only in one year 
0.1750 0.3803 0 1
Received outside budget in both years   0.0470 0.2118 0 1
Located in provincially designated 
township for poverty alleviation 
0.0891 0.2852 0 1
Village size (number of households)  629.0438 404.7998 50 3183
Per capita village revenue (yuan)   224.9570 545.1268 0 5557.7610
Proportion of out-migrants to total labor 
force 
0.2191 0.1498 0 0.7894
Distance from the nearest transportation 
station  
      
Less than 2 kilometers  0.4214 0.4942 0 1
2-5 kilometers  0.2917 0.4549 0 1
5-10 kilometers  0.1524 0.3597 0 1
10-20 kilometers  0.0843 0.2780 0 1
More than 20 kilometers  0.0502 0.2186 0 1
Time of road connected to township          
Before 1969  0.2788 0.4488 0 1
1970-79  0.2204 0.4149 0 1
1980-89  0.1378 0.3449 0 1
1990-98  0.1556 0.3628 0 1
1999 and after  0.1896 0.3923 0 1
Not yet connected   0.0178 0.1324 0 1
Primary school located in the village  0.6175 0.4864 0 1
“Dangerous building” in primary school 0.1086 0.3114 0 1
Distance from the township          
Less than 2 kilometers  0.1621 0.3688 0 1
2-5 kilometers  0.4165 0.4934 0 1
5-10 kilometers  0.3112 0.4634 0 1
10-20 kilometers  0.0973 0.2965 0 1
More than 20 kilometers  0.01297 0.1132 0 1
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Appendix Table 2 continued 
B. Western region (Southwestern and Ningxia) 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Categorical dependent variables: budget structure of public investment projects 2005-2006
Road construction/maintenance projects
 
      
No project at all  0.4893 0.5008  0  1 
Village budget only or receiving outside 
budget only in one year 
0.3643 0.4821  0  1 
Received outside budget in both years   0.1464 0.3542  0  1 
Primary school projects  
 
      
No project at all  0.8036 0.3980  0  1 
Village budget only or receiving outside 
budget only in one year 
0.0857 0.2804  0  1 
Received outside budget in both years   0.1107 0.3143  0  1 
Located in provincially designated 
township for poverty alleviation 
0.2143 0.4111  0  1 
Village size (number of households)  614.6835 342.449 84  2209 
Per capita village revenue (yuan)   41.9943 90.5644  0  958.6895 
Proportion of out-migration to total 
labor force 
0.3362 0.1778  0  0.1778 
Distance from the nearest transportation 
station  
      
Less than 2 kilometers  0.3855 0.4876  0  1 
2-5 kilometers  0.3127 0.4644  0  1 
5-10 kilometers  0.1818 0.3864  0  1 
10-20 kilometers  0.0764 0.2661  0  1 
More than 20 kilometers  0.0436 0.2047  0  1 
Time of road connected to township         
Before 1969  0.1782 0.3834  0  1 
1970-79  0.2691 0.4443  0  1 
1980-89  0.1636 0.3706  0  1 
1990-98  0.2145 0.4113  0  1 
1999 and after  0.1636 0.3706  0  1 
Not yet connected   0.0109 0.1041  0  1 
Primary school located in the village  0.6182 0.4867  0  1 
“Dangerous building” problem in 
primary school 
0.1164 0.3212  0  1 
Distance from the township         
Less than 2 kilometers  0.2364 0.4256  0  1 
2-5 kilometers  0.3745 0.4849  0  1 
5-10 kilometers  0.2327 0.4233  0  1 
10-20 kilometers  0.1345 0.3419  0  1 
More than 20 kilometers  0.0218 0.1464  0  1 
Number of observations used in the 
estimation 
266      
        
 